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Understanding Liberal Democracy: Essays in Political Philosophy, by Nicholas 
Wolterstorff. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 385 pages. $65 (hard-
cover).
KEVIN VALLIER, Bowling Green State University
Nicholas Wolterstorff is best known for his contributions to metaphys-
ics, aesthetics, the history of philosophy and, in particular, epistemology, 
philosophy of religion and the public role of religion in social life. And 
yet somehow he has managed, after a long career, to write a strikingly 
original and comprehensive set of essays in classical political philoso-
phy. Understanding Liberal Democracy is remarkable in a number of ways. 
First, it provides the most comprehensive and in-depth criticism of public 
reason liberalism available in print. Second, it advances an original neo- 
Kuyperian political philosophy that has yet to appear in analytic philoso-
phy. Third, it unifies much of Wolterstorff’s writings on the role of religion 
in politics. And, finally, it offers a variety of original arguments about 
how to ground human rights. In this review, I begin with an overview 
of the book. I then turn to criticize Wolterstorff’s attractive, if ultimately 
implausible, argument for a “protectionist” Christian defense of the right 
of religious freedom.
Understanding Liberal Democracy is divided into four broad parts. Part 
One, “Public Reason Liberalism,” contains Wolterstorff’s extensive criti-
cism of public reason approaches to politics. Public reason liberalism 
is a theory of the permissible use of state coercion and its authority to 
coerce. The view holds, roughly, that state coercion is justified or authori-
tative when the law on which the coercion is based is publicly justified, 
or justified to all reasonable points of view. A problem that Wolterstorff 
points out, and that has received attention from a number of others, is 
that justification to persons is in fact justification to idealized persons. 
Wolterstorff’s concern, in short, is that I cannot permissibly be coerced 
based on what my idealized counterpart accepts (40). Wolterstorff also 
offers an original critique of Gerald Gaus’s version of public reason ad-
vanced in Justificatory Liberalism, critiquing Gaus’s “moral demand” 
argument on several grounds, including that it too appeals to idealization 
(74). I think Gaus’s more developed theory of idealization and its connec-
tion to moral demands advanced in The Order of Public Reason answers 
some of Wolterstorff’s concerns, but I do not have the space to explain 
that here.
Part Two, “Re-Thinking Liberal Democracy,” contains two essays which 
cover explanations of authoritative government decision-making and 
citizens’ duties within liberal democracies. Wolterstorff thinks that the 
“governing idea” of liberal democracy is that of equal political voice plus 
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constitutional protection for natural rights (125). The most equitable and 
attractive theory of liberal democracy is one that accords persons equal 
political voice in the form of voting rights and public discussion. Citizens 
are obliged to sincerely offer their reasons for their political decisions to 
others and listen to other citizens do the same. Importantly, they are not 
required to censor their own views in any way beyond basic norms of 
civility, including their religious views (147).
Part Three, “Perspectives on Rights,” further develops Wolterstorff’s 
critique of secular attempts to ground human rights and advances a re-
vised theistic grounding of human rights from the account advanced in 
Justice: Rights and Wrongs. Wolterstorff also defends the claim that people 
have a right to a democratic state and gives a theistic account of the politi-
cal authority that compliments the view he develops in The Mighty and the 
Almighty. Part Four, “Liberal Democracy and Religion,” reviews and up-
dates Wolterstorff’s unique approach to religious contributions to politics 
and also argues that Christians have good theological reasons to support 
liberal democracy and the right to freedom of religious exercise (chapters 
9 and 12 respectively), among other things.
I have defended public reason views in several venues and I have af-
firmed many of Wolterstorff’s criticisms while arguing that they give us 
reason to endorse a “convergence” interpretation of public reason rather 
than a consensus view. But I will not address Wolterstorff’s criticisms of 
convergence here (105–108). Instead, I think we should turn to a matter 
of much greater interest to Faith and Philosophy readers, namely whether 
Wolterstorff has provided an adequate argument that Christians have 
good reason to support liberal democracy. Faith and Philosophy readers 
probably all endorse the political institutions of liberal democracy, and 
have some interest as to whether religious citizens have any significant 
reason to do so. Readers may rightly wonder whether citizens of faith, 
especially Christians, can accept the present political order in the econom-
ically advanced nations wholeheartedly or whether they must grudgingly 
go along with it.
Wolterstorff rightly points out that while many Christians look to St. 
Augustine and Thomas Aquinas with reverence on philosophical matters, 
they cannot do so with respect to freedom of religion, one of the cardi-
nal freedoms of liberal democracies (316–319). Augustine and Aquinas 
were, at times, serious opponents of freedom of religion. And Wolterstorff 
correctly argues that this opposition was due to their “perfectionist” un-
derstanding of politics, where it is the job of political order to promote a 
Christian conception of the good. Wolterstorff notes that Christians have 
largely, though not entirely, moved from a “perfectionist” understanding 
of politics to a “protectionist” view, where it is the job of political order 
to respect our human or natural rights (135). Wolterstorff thinks the pro-
tectionist view flows from Christians’ increasing recognition of the worth 
of individuals, worth that they receive from being the objects of God’s 
love and honor (197–198). But unfortunately Wolterstorff does not explain 
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whether the turn from Christian perfectionism to Christian protectionism 
is justified.
To see why, let’s consider some axiological points. Suppose that, ob-
jectively speaking, the God-given worth of individuals provides weighty 
reasons to respect individual rights, including the right to freedom of 
religious belief and expression. But suppose further that Christianity is in-
deed true, such that there are very strong reasons to promote Christianity, 
as Christian belief is a (if not the) clear, reliable path to eternal friendship 
with God. If so, it may appear that we have conflicting reasons: (i) reasons 
to respect the worth of persons by respecting their religious choices and 
(ii) reasons to do whatever we can to ensure that people come to Christian 
belief. In this way, we’re sensitive to both the moral reasons of “worth” 
celebrated by modern Christian protectionists like Wolterstorff and the 
moral reasons of “Christian goodness” celebrated by medieval Christian 
perfectionists like Augustine and Aquinas.
But now we are faced with two critical questions: which reasons are 
weightier? And why? I think any modern Christian will accept that there 
are protectionist reasons based in the worth of persons. But why should 
we think these reasons are sufficiently weighty to outweigh moral reasons 
of Christian goodness? After all, salvation might be on the line.
There is a reason why Christians have taken so long to recognize an 
intrinsic right of religious freedom: they were concerned with the eternal 
salvation of humanity, and thought themselves entitled to do what they 
could to bring it about. I believe they would find incredible the idea that rea-
sons of worth give us reason to respect mistaken religious choices. Wolterstorff 
rightly points out that states really can affect beliefs over time, in contrast to 
Locke’s well-known view (319). So why shouldn’t a Christian state do what 
it can to ensure that children learn true doctrine, even if this includes restric-
tions on freedom of religion?
One answer, suggested by Wolterstorff in conversation, is that reasons 
of worth generate obligations, whereas reasons of Christian goodness do 
not. And given the nature of obligation, we likely lack reason to ignore 
that obligation in order to promote Christian goodness. This is because 
violating the right of religious freedom is wrong and we should not do 
what is wrong. However, it makes sense to ask whether we have sufficient 
reason to do the wrong thing in some cases. Sometimes, perhaps, weighty 
reasons of beneficence give us sufficient reason to be unjust.
If I’m right, the only way to justify a right of religious freedom from 
a Christian perspective is to show that reasons of worth outweigh moral 
reasons of Christian goodness. But that’s a tall order given that the moral 
reasons of Christian goodness are reasons to promote infinite goods, the 
goods of knowing God eternally. How could any reasons of worth out-
weigh reasons to promote goods of infinite weight? Wolterstorff has 
not provided an adequate answer. Consequently, he has not shown that 
Christians have good reason to support religious freedom, and so that 
Christians have good reason to endorse one of the central planks of liberal 
Faith and Philosophy348
democracy. The question of the weight of reasons of worth, then, is central 
to Wolterstorff’s project in Understanding Liberal Democracy, and one that 
has not been sufficiently addressed.
I cannot defend an answer of my own here. But here’s a thought. Chris-
tians have always attached a great deal of weight to the importance of 
human free will in explaining the presence of great evil and suffering in 
the world. That is, Christians already think that God regards human free 
will as sufficiently precious to outweigh ending evil and simply “brain-
washing” us to have good motives and right beliefs. Perhaps this indicates 
that we have similar reasons to respect the free choices of individuals.
An obvious worry follows: God allows people to do all kinds of wicked 
things, and we surely don’t have reason to do the same. Christians think 
God has sufficient reason to allow Holocausts, but that humans surely 
have sufficient reason to use whatever coercive power we have to stop it. 
So why not think that, while God has reason to allow damnation, we must 
use whatever coercive power we have to stop it?
Reflection on the reasons God might allow damnation may point the 
way forward. In her new book on the problem of evil, Wandering in Dark-
ness, Eleonore Stump argues that God allows evil in part to produce a 
complete relationship with human beings, united in goodness. Perhaps 
our reason to respect freedom is that we can only achieve the sort of unity 
we wish to have with others and God eternally if we allow others to re-
ject us, and the True Church. The use of force cannot produce genuine 
unity, as it would merely displace their will with ours. I suggest then that 
Christians are already committed to holding that God has sufficient reason 
to allow damnation, an infinite loss, in order to respect freedom. If so, 
perhaps Christians have reason to allow similar losses in respecting an 
institutionalized right of religious freedom.
I find the problem of Christian toleration both fascinating and disturb-
ing. I am grateful to Wolterstorff for helping to bring this critical problem 
into focus and providing at least part of the answer.
Gratuitous Suffering and the Problem of Evil: A Comprehensive Introduction, by 
Bryan Frances. New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2013. Viii + 
196 pages. $39.95 (paperback).
KENNETH BOYCE, University of Missouri—Columbia
According to its back cover, this book promises to deliver a “lucid and 
jargon-free analysis of a variety of possible responses to the problem of 
gratuitous suffering.” It is also advertised as being “the perfect size and 
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